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Comments
The 1986 Amendments to California
Civil Code Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2:
Irreconcilable Differences Between the
Legislature and the Court?
INTRODUCTION
In order to simplify marital dissolutions, California community
property law attempts to delineate a predictable and uniform frame-
work for characterizing property acquired during marriage.' However,
due to a recent conflict between the California Legislature and the
California Supreme Court, the division of property upon marital
dissolution is no longer predictable or uniform.2 After the California
Supreme Court determined that certain retroactive applications of
Civil Code sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 were unconstitutional, the
legislature amended the statutes to provide a modified retroactive
scheme.3 The court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of the
newly enacted retroactive provisions of the statutes. 4 As a result,
lower courts and practitioners are faced with the dilemma of whether
to apply the amended statutes retroactively to current dissolution
proceedings and estate planning devices. 5 Despite the express intent
of the legislature in amending sections 4800.1 and 4800.2, the his-
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
2. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
3. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 49, sec. I, at 90-91, amended by 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 539, sec. 1,
at 94-95.
4. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
5. See Dubrow & Seligman, In Re Marriage of Fabian: Reimbursement for Separate
Property Contributions to Community Property Acquisitions, 3 L.A. LAWYER 34, 37-38 (1986)
(the authors discuss the chronological vagueness of the holding and the confusion generated
by In re Marriage of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986)).
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torical development of related statutory and case law leading to the
1986 amendments of sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 foreshadow an
unconstitutional fate for the 1986 amendments as well.
Initially, this comment will discuss the legislative and judicial
development of characterizing property acquired during marriage.
6
Second, the legislative intent underlying the 1984 enactment of sec-
tions 4800.1 and 4800.2 will be analyzed. 7 Third, this comment will
scrutinize the most recent California Supreme Court decisions in
order to gain insight into the analysis employed by the court in
determining the constitutionality of retroactive legislation.8 Next, the
judicial and legislative reactions to the decisions will be examined.9
Finally, this comment will analyze whether the retroactive provisions
of the 1986 amendments to sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 are consti-
tutional.
I. THE HISTORY OF PROPERTY CHARACTERIZATION METHODOLOGIES
A. Property Characterization Before 1984
1. California Civil Code Section 5110
Legislative provisions characterizing property acquired during mar-
riage as community or separate property are not a recent phenome-
non.' 0 The original statutory community property presumptions,
provided in Civil Code section 164, were very limited in scope."
Prior to 1965, the statutes divided property upon dissolution in
accordance with the form of title in which property was taken.' 2 For
example, in the 1950 dissolution decision Socol v. King,'3 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court determined the respective interests of a couple
6. See infra notes 10-49 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 70-172 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 173-209 and accompanying text.
10. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 5110 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988) (statutory presumptions
concerning property acquired by a husband or wife during marriage date back to at least
1872).
11. See e.g., 1941 Cal. Stat. ch. 455, sec. 1, at 1752 (amending CAL. CiV. CODE § 164)
(initial statutory presumptions based upon the form in which title was taken in property
acquired during marriage).
12. Id. (property acquired by husband and wife by an instrument in which they are
described as husband and wife).
13. 36 Cal. 342, 223 P.2d 627 (1950).
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who purchased a residencewith community funds and took title as
"husband and wife as joint tenants.' ' 4 The supreme court stated
that section 164 created a presumption that the residence was separate
property in which each spouse had a half interest." However, the
court held that the presumption was rebutted by evidence of an oral
agreement that the property was community property.
6
Fifteen years after Socol, the legislature observed that the majority
of married couples took title as joint tenants without knowing the
legal significance of the form in which title is taken. 7 The separate
property presumption pronounced in Socol was therefore inconsistent
with the ownership expectations of most couples. 8 Consequently, the
legislature amended section 164 in 1965.19 The amendment created a
presumption that a residence acquired by husband and wife as joint
tenants during marriage is community property. 20 The amendment to
section 164 reflected the legislative intent to maintain a body of law
consistent with the perceived expectations of married couples. 2'
The community property presumption created by the 1965 amend-
ment to section 164 was significant because until the 1985 enactment
of section 4800.5, courts lacked jurisdiction to divide joint tenancy
property and were therefore unable to provide a complete dissolution
of marital assets. 22 The community property presumption of section
164 allowed the courts to reach property held in joint tenancy.
23
However, the legislature did not prescribe a methodology for rebut-
ting the community property presumption provided in section 164.24
In 1969 the legislature enacted the Family Law Act which repealed
section 164.25 However, the Family Law Act incorporated a provision
14. Id. at 346, 223 P.2d at 631.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 813, 614 P.2d 285, 287-88, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 853, 857 (1980) (discussion of the legislative history surrounding the 1965 amendment
to section 165).
18. Id.
19. 1969 Cal. Stat. ch. 1608, sec. 8, at 3339 (amending 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1710, sec. I,
at 3843).
20. Id.
21. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 814, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57.
22. 1985 Cal. Stat. ch. 362, sec. 3, at 1518 (enacting CAL. CrV. CODE § 4800.5); See 18
Cal. L. Rev. Comm. Rep. 147 (1986) (provides the history of the courts jurisdiction in joint
tenancy properties upon dissolution of marriage and the legislative intent for section 4800.5).
23. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1710, sec. 1, at 3843 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 164) repealed
by 1969 Cal. Stat. ch. 1608, sec. 8, at 3339 (enacting CAL. Cry. CODE § 5110).
24. Id.
25. 1969 Cal. Stat. ch. 1608, sec. 8, at 3339 (enacting CAL. Cr. CODE §§ 4800-4812).
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almost identical to that of section 164 in section 5110.26 Additionally,
section 5110 expanded upon the presumption provided in section 164
by announcing two additional and distinct community property pres-
umptions pertaining to the acquisition of property during marriage.27
First, section 5110 establishes a general presumption that any property
acquired during marriage is community property. 28 Prior to the
enactment of section 4800.1, a party could rebut this general pre-
sumption by tracing the funds used to acquire the property to a
separate property source. Second, section 5110 establishes a pre-
sumption that property acquired by a husband and wife as husband
and wife is community property. 29 Finally, section 5110, restating the
presumption of former section 164, imposed a presumption that a
single family residence acquired by a husband and wife as joint
tenants0 was community property.3' The legislature did not define
the criteria for rebutting the presumptions enunciated in section 5110.
Consequently, the courts established the criteria. 2
2. In re Marriage of Lucas
In re Marriage of Lucas33 reflects the precise situation which
motivated the legislature to enact section 164, and subsequently,
section 5110.14 In Lucas, the husband and wife acquired a single
family residence, with separate and community funds, and took title
as husband and wife as joint tenants. The wife contributed over 27
percent of the purchase price of the family residence from her
26. CA. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
27. Id. The additional presumptions support the state policy favoring the community.
Two presumptions have not been affected by subsequent legislation and will not be discussed
further in this commehit. The first presumption concerns property acquired by the wife prior
to 1975. The presumptions enumerated in section 5110 are subject to the provisions of sections
5107, 5108 and 5126. Id.
28. Id. Real property had to be situated in California; personal property had no restrictions
as to location. Id.
29. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1988) (unless a different intention was expressed
in the instrument).
30. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 683 (West Supp. 1988) (definition of joint tenancy).
31. Id. § 5110 (amended by 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 342, sec. 3, at ).
32. In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 808, 536 P.2d 479, 166 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975) (where
no written indication of ownership is indicated, tracing property to a separate source rebuts
the general presumption that all property acquired during marriage is community property).
In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980) (evidentiary
requirements for rebutting the presumption arising from the form in which title was taken).
33. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
34. See supra notes 11-33 and accompanying text.
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separate funds.3 - She also contributed almost $3000 toward improving
the residence.16 The couple used community funds for other expenses
including the payment of taxes, interest, and the reduction of prin-
cipal.37 The wife contended that since she could trace the funds used
to acquire the residence to a separate property source, she held a
separate property interest in the residence. 3 The Lucas court rejected
her contention based upon the policy considerations underlying the
enactment of section 51 10. 39 The court reasoned that a party would
not take title in joint and equal ownership form if a party intended
to retain a separate property interest40
The Lucas court seems to defer to legislative intent and follow
established precedent. The rationale underlying section 5110 is con-
sistent with Lucas since both resolve disputes in favor of the com-
munity.4' Moreover, the legislature did not disapprove of the
methodology for rebutting the form of title presumption enumerated
by the court in Socol v. King.42 Therefore, requiring proof of an
oral or written agreement concerning the character of the property
is consistent with developing community property law:43
The Lucas court also stated that if the spouse successfully proved
the existence of an oral or written agreement indicating that the
contribution was to remain separate property, the party was entitled
to a pro rata apportionment of the value of the residence at the time
of dissolution." From Lucas until the enactment of section 4800.2
in 1984, a separate property contribution toward the acquisition of
property held in joint tenancy established the presumption of a gift
to the community. Until the enactment of section 4800.1 in 1984,
35. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 811-12, 614 P.2d at 286, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857. The wife was relying on the rule
set forth in In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 379, 166 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975).
Id.
39. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857. See supra notes
25-32 and accompanying text (discussion of legislative intent underlying the enactment of §
5110).
40. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857 (she had not
communicated her intent to retain a separate interest). The court also explains the result in
terms of protecting the expectations of the parties. Id.
41. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1988).
42. Id. (section 5110 does not discuss the methods for rebutting the presumptions enu-
merated by the statute). In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 813, 614 P.2d at 287, 166
Cal. Rptr. at 856 (1980). See Socol v. King, 36 Cal. 342, 223 P.2d 627 (1950).
43. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
44. Id.
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proof of an oral or written agreement to the contrary was sufficient
to rebut the presumption.
4
1
B. The Enactment of Civil Code Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2
In 1983, the California Legislature significantly changed the meth-
odology for characterizing property upon the dissolution of mar-
riage.4 6 To illustrate, the legislature deleted the form of title
presumptions provided in section 5110 and redefined those presump-
tions in the newly enacted section 4800.1. 47 Additionally, the legis-
lature imposed a writing requirement to rebut the form of title
presumptions provided in section 4800.1.48 Perhaps most porten-
tously, in enacting section 4800.2 the legislature reversed Lucas.
4 9
Section 4800.2 provides that a separate property contribution to the
acquisition of property during marriage is not presumed to be a gift
to the community. 50
1. The Legislative Intent of Section 4800.1
In enacting section 4800.1, the legislature expanded the application
of the presumption that a single family residence held in joint tenancy
is community property." Under the language of the 1984 enactment
of section 4800.1 the presumption applied to all property acquired
45. See id. (the committee states that section 4800.1 limits the manner in which property
may be transmuted).
46. See generally Abney, Joint Tenancy/Community Property Presumption and Separate
Property Reimbursement: Legislative History of California Law Provides Guidance, I 1 CoiM.
PROP. J 275 (1984) (provides in-depth review of the legislative history of sections 4800.1 and
4800.2). See generally Shue and Veldman, supra note 29, at 7 (discussion of the presumptions
prescribed by section 5110 and the ways in which they were affected by section 4800.1).
47. CAt. CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1988).
48. Id. (requires a clear statement in the deed or other evidence of title or other proof
of a written agreement that the property is separate). See Roman, The Division of Marital
property Before and After In re Marriage of Buol and In re Marriage of Fabian, 16 Sw. U.L.
REv. 563, 565-66 (1986) (discusses the evidentiary changes mandated by § 4800.1). See also
Adams and Sevitch, CAL. F.m. L. REP., § D. 11.3 (1986) (discusses the evidentiary requirements
before and after the enactment of § 4800.1); See generally Abney, Impact of California
Community Property Presumptions on Joint Tenancy, 13 CoMf. PROP. J. 40 (1987) (provides
a brief history of the form of title presumption as defined by statutory and case law).
49. See 16 CAL. L. REv. CoMM. REP. 2165 (1982) (the legislature intended to reverse
Lucas).
50. CA. Civ. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1988).
51. Id. § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1987). See 16 CA. L. REv. COMM. REP. 2165 (1982)
(discusses the effect of section 4800.1 on the provisions of section 5110).
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during marriage in "joint tenancy form. "52 Again, the legislature
noted that most married couples take title in joint tenancy form
without knowing the legal significance of joint tenancy.53 In enacting
section 4800.1, the legislature intended to reconcile the statutory
presumptions with the reasonable expectations of married couples.14
Section 4800.1 modifies the Lucas rule pertaining to oral agree-
ments.5 5 Under section 4800.1, a party attempting to rebut the
presumption that property acquired in joint tenancy form is com-
munity property must furnish proof of a written agreement that the
property is separate property.5 6 The legislature was concerned that
the minimal evidentiary requirements set forth in Lucas were insuf-
ficient to protect the statutory form of title presumptions. 7 As a
result, section 4800.1 imposes a statute of frauds58 upon the party
attempting to rebut the form of title presumptions.5 9
2. The Legislative Intent of Section 4800.2
The legislature specifically stated that section 4800.2 overrules
Lucas 0 Under section 4800.2, a separate property contributor retains
a right of reimbursement from the community if the contributor can
52. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 342, sec. 1, at 1538 (enacting CAL. Crv. CODE § 4800.1) amended
by 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 539, sec. I at
53. See In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal App. 3d 117, 123-25, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341, 345-
46 (1984) (the decision provides an excellent review of legislative intent and includes a copy
of the Senate Committee on Judiciary Report on §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2). The legislative intent
expressed for the expansion of the presumption is similar to the legislative intent expressed
for the presumption announced in sections 164 and 5110 and discussed in Lucas. Id.
54. Id.
55. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1988).
56. Id. § 4800.1(b)(2). The parties must present a deed or other evidence of title containing
a clear statement that the property is separate property). Id. § 4800.1(b)(1).
57. See Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d at 120-21, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45 (in-depth discussion
of the committee reports on section 4800.1).
58. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1091 (the transfer of an interest in property exceeding
one year's duration must be in writing). See also Abney, supra note 46, at 42 (the author refers
to the provision as a "novel" statute of frauds).
59. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (b) (West Supp. 1988).
60. See 16 CAL. L. REv. COMM. REP. 2165 (1982) (section 4800.2 overrules the gift
presumption prescribed by Lucas). The legislature regarded the Lucas rule, denying a separate
property contributor credit for a contribution, as inequitable. Id. Apparently, Lucas exceeded
the scope of the legislative intent underlying the form of title presumption prescribed in section
5110. See In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 127-29, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341, 348-50
(1984) (reviewing the existing reimbursement schemes section affected by 4800.2). The Lucas
court stated that their decision was faithful to both existing legislative intent and to existing
case law. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 814-15, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
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trace the contributions to a separate property source. 61 To overcome
the reimbursement provision, the community must produce a written
waiver by the separate property contributor waiving the right to
reimbursement.
62
Furthermore, the reimbursement provision of section 4800.2 pro-
duces a markedly different result than the pro rata apportionment
method used to calculate the separate property interest in situations
where there is a Lucas agreement. 63 Section 4800.2 prohibits the
separate property contributor from sharing in the appreciated value
of the property acquired with the separate property contribution.
64
Conversely, under the Lucas rule, once a separate property contrib-
utor established the existence of an agreement, the separate property
contributor was entitled to an apportioned share of the appreciated
value of the property. Section 4800.2, therefore, has a significant
impact on the financial interests of a party who contributes separate
property to the acquisition of joint tenancy property during mar-
riage.65
C. Judicial Interpretation of Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2
The legislature enacted sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 on January 1,
1984 with explicit retroactive provisions. 66 Both sections were appli-
cable to cases which were filed prior to but not yet final as of
January 1, 1984.67 Shortly after the enactment of sections 4800.1 and
4800.2, creative appellants sought to take advantage of these changes
by applying the newly enacted evidentiary requirements and reim-
bursement rules to cases filed prior to January 1, 1984 but still on
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (west Supp. 1988) (the reimbursement is measured as the
value of the contribution at the time the contribution was made).
62. Id. (or a writing which has the effect of a waiver).
63. Id. (denies the separate property contributor a share in the appreciation of the
property). See Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289-90, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858 (discussion
of pro-rata calculations).
64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (vest Supp. 1988) (the reimbursement is limited to the
amount of contribution at the time the separate contribution was made). See 16 CAL. L. REV.
Cozle. REP. 2165 (1982) (discussion of reimbursement calculations). This is equivalent to an
interest free loan to the community. Shue & Velman, supra note 5 at 8 (the authors also state
that section 4800.2 supports the public policy favoring community property by awarding the
appreciated valued of the property to the community).
65. See Adams & Sevitch, supra note 52 at D.II.4.1.(c) (description of the impact of
section 4800.2).
66. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 342, sec. 1, at 1538 amended by 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 49, sec. 1, at
- (mandating the retroactive application of both sections).
67. Id.
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appeal as of that date.6 Two California Supreme Court decisions,
In re Marriage of Buo169 and In re Marriage of Fabian,70 held that
sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 could not be applied to cases filed before
January 1, 1984'.
7
1. In re Marriage of Buol
The California Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Buol, ruled
that retroactive application of section 4800.1 to cases filed before
the enactment of the statute impaired vested rights without due
process of law. 72 In Buol, the wife purchased a single family residence
in 1963 with separate funds and took title in joint tenancy with her
husband. 73 The trial court found that the couple orally agreed that
the residence was the separate property of the wife.74 At the time
she acquired the property, section 164 was current law. 75 Under
concurrent case law, proof of an oral agreement that the wife retained
a separate property interest successfully rebutted the statutory pre-
sumption that the residence was community property. 76 The husband
filed for dissolution on August 10, 1980. At the time the dissolution
was filed section 5110 was current law. 77 Under concurrent case law,
proof of an oral agreement that the wife retained a separate interest
successfully rebutted the presumption that the residence was com-
68. See In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 756, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1985) (the appellant sought to apply retroactively section 4800.1). See In re Marriage of
Fabian, 41 Cal 3d 440, 442-43, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986) (the appellant sought
to apply retroactively section 4800.2).
69. 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985).
70. 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986).
71. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 764, 705 P.2d at 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 39; Fabian 41 Cal. 3d
at 451, 715 P.2d at 259-60, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40.
72. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 764, 705 P.2d at 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 39. Prior to Buol, district
courts disagreed as to whether the retroactive application of 4800.1 to cases not yet final on
January 1, 1984 impaired vested property rights without due process of law. Compare In re
Marriage of Martinez, 156 Cal. App. 3d 20, 202 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1984) (allowed retroactive
application of section 4800.1), disapproved, Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 763 n.10, 705 P.2d at 362
n.10, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 38 n.10 with In re Marriage of Milse, 182 Cal. App. 3d 203, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 70 (1984) (held that retroactive application of section 4800.1 was unconstitutional). See
Roman, supra note 52, at 566-72 (analysis of the appellate court section 4800.1 retroactivity
decisions preceding Buo).
73. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 755, 705 P.2d at 355-56, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33.
74. Id.
75. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 342, sec. 1, at 3843 ( amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 164) repealed
by 1969 Cal. Stat. ch. 1608, sec. 8, at 3339 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110).
76. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 757, 705 P.2d at 357-58, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983) amended by 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 342, sec. 3, at
1538 and 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 128, sec. I at _
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munity property. 78 Thus, the result would have been the same whether
the court applied the law in effect at the time the couple acquired
the property or at the time the husband filed the dissolution petition.
Accordingly, the trial court held that the residence was the separate
property of the wife. 79 The husband was, therefore, not entitled to
an interest in the property.
The husband appealed the decision. While the appeal was pending
the legislature enacted section 4800.1.80 The husband attempted to
invoke the newly enacted statute.8' The couple did not have a written
agreement; therefore, under section 4800.1, the property would be
characterized as community property. Accordingly, the husband would
be entitled to a one half interest in the value of the property at the
time of entitled to a one half interest in the value of the property
at the time of dissolution.8 2 The wife claimed that retroactive appli-
cation of 4800.1, as provided within the statute, would impair her
vested property interest without due process of law. 3 The court
resolved the due process issue by employing a two part test: First,
the court determined whether the wife held a vested separate property
interest in the asset;84 second, the court determined whether the
legislature could deprive the wife of her interest without violating
due process of law.85
a. The Vested Interest Analysis
The Buol court defined a vested property interest as a right in
property free from any condition precedent." Stating that property
is normally characterized as community or separate at the time of
acquisition,87 the court applied the law in effect at the time the couple
78. Buol 39 Cal. 3d at 757, 705 P.2d at 357-58, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
79. Id. at 755, 705 P.2d at 356, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1988) (provides that the court shall, in the
absence of enumerated circumstances, equally divide the community assets upon dissolution).
Under section 4800.2, the court would reimburse the separate property contribution of the
wife prior to dividing the community property assets. Id. § 4800.2.
83. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 756, 705 P.2d at 357, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34. See CAL. CoNsT. art.
I, § 7 (due process clause).
84. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 756-69, 705 P.2d at 357-58, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34-36.
85. Id. The court stated that statutory language alone will not always answer this issue;
thus, a more extensive inquiry concerning the "realities" of the situation was warranted. Id.
at 758, 705 P.2d at 358, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
86. Id. at 757 n.6, 705 P.2d at 357 n.6, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34 n.6. See In re Marriage of
Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
87. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 591, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432 (citing Trimble
v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 343, 26 P.2d 477, 479 (1933)).
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acquired the residence to determine whether the separate property of
the wife was subject to a condition precedent.88 Since the couple
effectuated an oral agreement regarding the nature of the property,
the Buol court concluded that the wife held a vested separate property
interest from the time of acquisition.
8 9
The court also discussed an alternate analysis for determining
whether the separate property right was vested. Two district courts 90
concluded that rather than altering vested rights retroactive applica-
tion of section 4800.1 merely altered the evidentiary burden of
proof.9' The Buol court determined that retroactive application of
the writing requirement created an impossible evidentiary burden for
the party asserting a separate property interest. 92 Imposing an im-
possible evidentiary burden equates to a substantive measure and,
therefore, results in more than a mere alteration of an evidentiary
burden. 93 Consequently, the court was required to determine whether
impairment of the wife's property right violated due process of law.
b. The Due Process Analysis
The test for determining whether the state may deprive a citizen
of a vested right without violating due process of law is well estab-
lished in California. In exercise of state police power, the state may
88. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 757, 705 P.2d at 358, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
89. Id. The court also stated the couple's oral agreement sufficiently established the wife's
separate property interest under the applicable law at the time of the trial and at the time of
entry of the original judgment. Id.
90. See In re Marriage of Martinez, 156 Cal. App. 3d 20, 202 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1984),
disapproved, Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 763 n.10, 705 P.2d at 362 n.10, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 38 n.10,
In re Marriage of Taylor, 160 Cal. App. 3d 471, 206 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984), disapproved,
Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 763 n.10, 705 P.2d at 362 n.10, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 38 n.10.
91. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 758, 705 P.2d at 358, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35. Section 4800.1
explicitly states that the presumption affects the burden of proof. See CAL. CMv. CODE § 4800.1
(West Supp. 1988). Generally, the legislature may retroactively alter evidentiary or procedural
rules. See Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 758, 705 P.2d at 358, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35; see also 5 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNL4 LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 282-286 (8th ed. 1974 and
Supp. 1984). See generally Comment, Retroactive Application of California Civil Code Section
4800.1: Procedural Rule of Violation of Due Process?, 16 PAC. L.J. 1007 (1985) (review of
previous distinctions between vested rights and evidentiary rules). However, when a vested
right has been altered by the application of an apparently evidentiary or procedural rule,
courts will look beyond the form of the rule and focus instead on the substantive impact of
the rule. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 758, 705 P.2d at 358, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35. See Vegetable Oil
Products Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 252, 258, 28 Cal. Rptr. 555, 560 (1963)
(when a statute operates to eliminate an existing remedy the statute normally conflicts with
due process). The opportunity to memorialize the Buols' oral agreement passed prior to the
enactment of section 4800.1. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 759, 705 P.2d at 358, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
92. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 759, 705 P.2d at 359, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36.
93. Id. at 760, 705 P.2d at 359, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 36 (especially when property rights are
impaired).
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impair vested rights if reasonably necessary for the protection of the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare of its citizens. 94 In analyzing
whether a statute violates the due process standard, courts generally
balance the state interest in enacting the statute95 and the extent of
the affected party's reliance on the former law.9
The first factor discussed in Buol, the importance of the state
interest served by the statute, is well settled. 97 Previous California
Supreme Court decisions have held that the state interest in providing
an equitable dissolution of marriages is significant.9 The Buol court
reaffirmed the vitality of this precedent. 99 Having found a sufficiently
important state interest, the court then examined the nexus between
the need for retroactive application and the effectuation of the state
interest. 100
Retroactive application of a statute that impairs a vested right is
permitted only where the statute remedies a manifestly unjust law.' 0'
The Buol court looked toward legislative findings pertaining to flaws
in the prior law. 102 The court found that the legislature was concerned
that proof of an oral agreement could easily be fabricated. 03 The
legislature believed a statute of frauds provision would protect the
community property interest from fabricated claims.10 This concern
94. See Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 566, 399 P.2d 897, 907, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97,
106 (1965). See Comment, supra note 96 at 1024-26 (summary of community property decisions
which focused on due process).
95. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 761, 705 P.2d at 360, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (quoting In re Marriage
of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976)). As
part of the state interest analysis, courts will consider the following factors: The importance
of the state interest served by the statute; the nexus between retroactive application of the
statute and the effectuation of the state interest. Id.
96. Id. In weighing the reliance factor the courts will consider: the extent the party relied
upon the former law; whether the reliance was legitimate; the magnitude of the actions taken
based upon the reliance; and, the extent of the disruption caused by the retroactive application
of the new statute on those actions. Id. The California Supreme Court first set forth this
analysis in Bouquet. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376,
128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432. The Bouquet court did not actually apply this analysis. Id. The court
reached the decision before actually applying the factors to the facts. Id. See Comment, supra
note 96, at 1016-17.
97. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d at 566, 399 P.2d at 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
98. Id.
99. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 761, 705 P.2d at 360, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (the court refers to
the "states paramount interest in the equitable dissolution of the marital partnership").
100. Id.
101. Id.; See Adams & Sevitch, supra note 52 at D.11.5.0.
102. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 761, 705 P.2d at 360, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
103. See In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 124-27, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341, 348-
50 (1984) (the court provides an in depth analysis of legislative intent underlying section
4800.1).
104. See 16 CAL. L. REv. COM.i. REP. 2165 (1982). The legislature also readdressed its
concern over the lack of understanding most married couples have concerning the effect of
taking title in joint tenancy. Id.
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was the primary impetus for the enactment of section 4800.1.105
Despite these findings of legislative intent, the court concluded that
4800.1 did not cure a manifestly unjust law. The court also failed
to find any nexus between retroactive application and the promotion
of equitable marital dissolutions. 106 Furthermore, the court observed
that the 1984 enactment of section 4800.1 did not remedy all the
alleged problems with joint tenancy title presumptions. 0 7 For exam-
ple, married couples may take title to property in forms other than
joint tenancy, or they may acquire non-title property. 08 Section 5110
remained applicable to those acquisitions, since the 1984 enactment
of section 4800.1 was expressly limited to property taken in joint
tenancy form.1 9 Consequently, the court concluded that section 4800.1
failed to obviate the legislature's concern.
Next, the Buol court examined the degree and the validity of the
parties' reliance on former law. 110 Because the husband or wife
presented no direct evidence"' to demonstrate the extent of reliance,
the court had to infer"2 the extent of the parties reliance."' Based
solely upon the limited findings of the trial court, the California
Supreme Court concluded that the degree of the parties' reliance on
former law was difficult to ascertain." 4 Nevertheless, the court spec-
ulated that the couple would have executed a written agreement if
prior law required one, because the couple formed an oral agreement
which was sufficient under prior law to protect their expectations
105. See 16 CAL. L. Rav. COMM. REP. 2165 (1982).
106. Id. Perhaps one reason for this finding is that prior to the enactment of section
4800.1, the form of title presumptions were rebuttable solely by judicially created evidentiary
requirements. Id.
107. Id.
108. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1988) (provides forms in which couples may
acquire property).
109. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 342, sec. 1, at 1538 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1 ) amended
by 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 539, sec. 1 at - The 1984 enactment of section 4800.1 left a
significant percentage of transactions subject to rebuttal by evidence of an oral agreement.
Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 762-63, 705 P.2d at 361, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
110. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 763, 705 P.2d at 361-62, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39. (the court
briefly discussed the factors but provided little insight for their conclusions). See supra note
101.
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § 410 (,Vest Supp.1988) (evidence that directly proves a fact without
an inference or assumption).
112. Id. § 600 (West Supp. 1988) (a deduction of fact that may be logically and reasonably
drawn from another fact or conclusion).
113. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 763, 705 P.2d at 361-62, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 38 (in fact, neither
party presented evidence demonstrating knowledge of former law).
114. Id. The trial court found that the couple formed a valid oral agreement that the
residence was the separate property of the wife. Id. The couple took title as joint tenants
solely at the suggestion of a realtor. Id.
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regarding the status of the property." 5 The validity of the court's
speculation concerning the written agreement is suspect, since neither
party asserted any knowledge of prior law, nor did either show that
they relied on the advice of someone who did. The analysis seems
to focus upon the expectation of the parties rather than the actual
extent of reliance on former law."
6
The court held that retroactive application of section 4800.1 would
impair the vested separate property interest of Mrs. Buol without
due process of law." 7 In the final paragraph of the decision, the
Buol court appears to limit the holding to cases filed before the
enactment of section 4800.1.18 However, commentators and lower
courts have expressed considerable uncertainty as to the limits of the
Buol holding." 9 Approximately six months after determining the
constitutionality of the retroactive application of section 4800.1, the
California Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Fabian20 , decided
an identical issue concerning section 4800.2.121
2. In re Marriage of Fabian
The legislature explicitly stated that both sections 4800.1 and 4800.2
were applicable to cases not final as of January 1, 1984. Similar to
Buol, the litigants in Fabian acquired marital property and filed for
dissolution of their marriage before the legislature enacted section
4800.2.122 The couple took title as "husband and wife as community
115. Id.
116. Id. "The parties' legitimate expectations, therefore, are substantially disregarded in
favor of needless retroactivity." Id.
117. Id. at 764, 705 P.2d at 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
118. Id. (retroactivity would equate to a "penalty for lack of prescience of changes in the
law occurring after trial").
119. See Adams & Sevitch, supra note 52, at D.11.5.0.2 ("the elusive Buol date could turn
out to be the date of judgment, the date of trial, the date the petition is filed, the date the
property is 'acquired' in joint tenancy, or the date on which the oral Lucas agreement is
made"). See also Abney, supra note 50, at 42-45 (discussion of the impact Buol will have on
all retroactive applications of section 4800.1 as uncertain); Roman, supra note 52 at 575 (the
author raises questions regarding the dates to which Buol would apply). When an officer of
the California Law Review Commission asked the supreme court to clarify the limits of the
Buol holding, the supreme court denied the request. See Adams & Sevitch, supra note 52, at
D.11.5.0.2 (the request was made one month after the decision was published and was denied
22 days later).
120. 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986).
121. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 440, 715 P.2d at 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35.
122. Id. at 443-44, 715 P.2d at 254-55, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35 (the property was acquired
in 1972 with title taken as husband and wife as community property).
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property."' 23 The husband claimed that he contributed over $275,000
from a separate property source for improvements to the community
property. 2 4 The trial court found that the couple did not have an
agreement regarding a right to reimbursement; therefore, the property
was community property.2 5 The husband appealed the judgment.126
While the appeal was pending, the legislature enacted section 4800.2.
Under section 4800.2, the husband would be entitled to reimburse-
ment for his separate property contribution, providing that he could
trace the contribution to a separate property source. 2 7
The constitutional issue in Fabian was very similar to that in Buol:
Whether retroactive application of section 4800.2, as mandated in
section 4800.1, deprived the wife of a vested community property
interest without due process of law. 8 Before determining whether
impairment of the community property interest was unconstitutional,
the Fabian court first decided whether the wife held a vested interest
in a community asset.
a. The Vested Rights Analysis
The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court's holding that
the husband failed to rebut the presumption that the property was
community property.2 9 Applying the law in effect at the time the
couple acquired the property, the Fabian court determined that the
form in which the couple took title created a rebuttable presumption
123. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 443, 715 P.2d at 254, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 334. Under existing
law at the time the property was acquired, the property would have been presumed to be
community property due to the form in which the couple took title. See CAL. CIV. CODE §
5110 (West Supp. 1988).
124. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 443, 715 P.2d at 254, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
125. Id. (judgment was entered on April 23, 1982). Under existing law at the time of
acquisition and at the time of trial, the husband was required to offer proof of a contrary
agreement to rebut the presumption the that the contribution was a gift to the community.
Id.
126. Id. (the husband claimed the court erred in characterizing the property, a motel, as
marital property rather than business investment).
127. Id. Under prior law, a separate contribution to a community interest was presumed
to be a gift to the community in the absence of an oral or written agreement. See, e.g., Lucas,
27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 202 Cal. Rptr. 853 (origin of the gift presumption). The
community would share in the remaining balance of the value of the property after the husband
was reimbursed his $275,000 separate property contribution. CAL. CrV. CODE § 4800.2 (West
Supp. 1988). Consequently, retroactive application of section 4800.2 would operate to reimburse
the husband for his separate property contribution at the expense of the community. Id.
128. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 447, 715 P.2d at 257, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
129. Id. at 445, 715 P.2d at 256 ,224 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
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that the property was community property.
130 The trial court deter-
mined that the husband failed to rebut the presumption; thus, the
property was community property.
3' The supreme court agreed.1
3 2
Next, the Fabian court determined whether the wife had a vested
community property interest. The court, revising the definition of
vested enunciated in Buol, stated that the wife had a vested com-
munity property interest in the motel from the time of purchase .
33
The supreme court also considered the potential interests arising from
the separate property contribution for improvements to the motel.
3 4
The court applied the Lucas rule and concluded that the husband
failed to rebut the presumption that the contribution was a gift to
the community. 35 However, the court stated that the wife had vested
rights in the property as community property when the trial court
entered judgment on the dissolution. 36 Thus, the Fabian court ad-
vanced three potential theories for the analysis of a vested property
interest: (1) A property interest is vested at the time of purchase in
the absence of any contrary agreement; (2) a property interest is
vested at the time of a separate property contribution when the
separate property contributor falls to rebut the statutory presumption;
and, (3) a property interest is vested when a court enters judgment
declaring the existence of the interest.
37
The California Supreme Court also determined whether retroactive
application of section 4800.2 would actually impair the vested prop-
erty interest of the wife.3 8 The court compared the value of the
community property interest under both prior law and section 4800.2.1
9
Retroactive application of section 4800.2 would impair the wife's vested
interest to the extent of $138,000. Because the court determined that
130. Id. The court subscribed to the maxim that property is normally characterized as
community or separate at the time the property is acquired. Id. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110
(West 1983) (section 5110 was the operative law at the time of acquisition).
131. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 443, 715 P.2d at 256, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
132. Id. at 446-47, 715 P.2d at 256-57, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
133. Compare Id. at 446, 715 P.2d at 446, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 336 (wife had a vested interest
at time of purchase) with In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 757, 705 P.2d at 357, 218
Cal. Rptr. at 34 (vested means interest not subject to a condition precedent). The Fabian court
stated that the record was devoid of any evidence that the property was not to be community
property. Fabian, 41 Cal.3d at 446, 715 P.2d at 256, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
134. Fabian, 41 Cal.3d at 446, 715 P.2d at 256, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 446-51, 715 P.2d at 257-60, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 337-40. See Adams & Sevitch
supra note 52, at D.11.5.0.2 (the authors note similar problems in determining the timing or
vesting).
138. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 447-48, 715 P.2d at 257, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
139. Id. at 448, 715 P.2d at 257, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38.
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the wife held a vested interest in the motel as community property,
and the retroactive application of section 4800.2 would impair that
interest, the supreme court proceeded to analyze whether impairment
of the vested interest was constitutional. 40
b. The Due Process Analysis
The due process analysis employed in Fabian paralleled the ap-
proach the court took in Buol.'41 To determine whether retroactive
application of section 4800.2 was reasonably necessary, the Fabian
court considered such factors as the importance of the state interest,
the nexus between retroactive application of a statute and the effec-
tuation of the statute. The court also considered whether the parties
relied on the former law and the whether their reliance was legitimate.
In Buol the court considered legislative intent, but did not find a
sufficiently significant state interest in implementing section 4800.1
to warrant retroactive application of the statute. 142 The Fabian court
also examined the legislative intent in enacting section 4800.2.143 The
court found that the legislature was concerned that the result reached
in Lucas did not accurately reflect the expectation of parties who
contribute separate property funds to the community. 1'
The court stated that prior to the enactment of section 4800.2, a
spouse wishing to preserve the separate property status of a contri-
bution could have done so by simply informing the other spouse that
the contribution was not a gift.1 4s Consequently, the court did not
find that prior law was manifestly unjust. 46 Since, retroactive appli-
cation of the statute did not cure an unjust law, the court reasoned
that the state interest in the equitable dissolution of marriages was
not enhanced by retroactive application of section 4800.2.147
140. Id. at 447, 715 P.2d at 257, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38.
141. Id. at 448, 715 P.2d at 337, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 257-58. See Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 761-
62, 705 P.2d at 360-61, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38. The state, when exercising its police powers,
may impair vested rights if enactment of a law is considered reasonably necessary for the
protection of the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the people. See Addison v.
Addison 62 Cal. 2d 558, 566, 399 P.2d 897, 907, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 106 (1965); Comment,
supra note 96 at 1024-26 (summary of community property decisions which focused on due
process).
142. Id. (applies to cases filed prior to the enactment of the statute).
143. Fabian 41 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 449, 715 P.2d at 258-59, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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In Fabian, as in Buol, the supreme court found that the extent to
which the parties relied on former law was difficult to ascertain.
14
Consequently, the court focused instead on whether reliance on the
former law was legitimate. 49 Under the law existing at the time of
acquisition, the husband could have protected his interest by executing
an oral or written agreement with the wife at the time of the
acquisition. 50 The court speculated that if the couple had sought
competent counsel, they would have been advised of the applicable
presumptions concerning the status of the property as well as the
method in which to rebut the presumptions.' 5' Prior to enacting
4800.2, the legislature expressed no concern with the judicially created
Lucas rule; therefore, the court concluded that a party, or counsel,
could have legitimately relied on the former law.
Finally, the court considered the extent that retroactive application
of section 4800.2 would disrupt the expectations of the parties.
52
The husband was responsible for his predicament because he failed
to protect the separate property interest by invoking the methods
available at the time of the contribution.' Moreover, the husband
would probably be unwilling to sign a written waiver to his right of
reimbursement for the separate property contribution after he filed
the petition for dissolution. ' 54 Yet, if section 4800.2 were retroactively
applied, the wife would need to furnish proof of such a waiver in
order to protect the community's one half interest in the full value
of the property. 5 The court stated that this dilemma facing the wife
was an example of the severely disruptive effect the retroactive
application of section 4800.2 would have on marital dissolution
proceedings.'
5 6
Fabian held that retroactive application of section 4800.2 to cases
filed prior to the enactment of the statute impaired vested property
rights without due process of law. 15 7 The California Supreme Court
148. Id. (reliance was "difficult to pinpoint with accuracy"). See In re Marriage of BuoI,.
39 Cal. 3d at 763, 705 P.2d at 361-62, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
149. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 450, 715 P.2d at 259, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
150. Id. (by stating that the contribution was to remain his separate property).
151. Id. at 449, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 450, 715 P.2d at 259, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
154. Id.
155. CAL. Cwy. CODE § 4800.2 (Vest Supp. 1988).
156. Fabian 41 Cal. 3d at 450, 715 P.2d at 259, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (retroactive
application would disrupt "the interest of finality, uniformity, and predictability" of marital
property dissolutions).
157. Id. at 451, 715 P.2d at 259-60, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40.
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expressly limited the holding of Fabian to cases pending on the date
the legislature enacted section 4800.1.158 Given the analysis in Fabian,
however, rights may vest upon the occurrence of at least two con-
ditions in addition to the one specifically referred to in the holding.
59
As a result of the deliberate limitation of the holdings of Buol and
Fabian to cases filed before the enactment of sections 4800.1 and
4800.2, the legislature, lower courts and practitioners are unclear as
to the applicability of the sections to cases filed after their enact-
ment. 160
D. Legislative and Judicial Reaction to Buol and Fabian
Since the California Supreme Court decisions of Buol and Fabian,
only two appellate court decisions, In re Marriage of Delgado'61 and
In re Marriage of Griffis162, have ruled on the retroactive application
of sections 4800.1 and 4800.2. Unfortunately, both decisions involved
the application of sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 to cases filed before
the legislature enacted the 1986 amendments to the sections. Never-
theless, the analysis employed by the appellate courts provide insight
to the judicial reaction to Buol and Fabian.
63
1. In re Marriage of Delgado
The chronology of events in Delgado was similar to Buol. Prior
to the enactment of section 4800.1, the couple in Delgado acquired
158. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 451 n.12, 715 P.2d at 260 n.12, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 340 n.12
(expressly limits the holding to cases filed prior to the enactment of section 4800.2: " We
hold only that application of the statute to cases pending on January 1, 1984 impairs vested
rights without due process of law").
159. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (provides the three theories advanced by
the court pertaining to the vesting of rights). Because the court stated that the wife had a
vested interest from the time of purchase, any retroactive application of section 4800.2 adversely
affecting a right that vested prior to the section's enactment would seem to violate due process.
See Dubrow and Seligman, supra note 5, at 37-38 (the authors discuss the chronological
vagueness of the holding and the confusion generated by Fabian).
160. See Dubrow and Seligman, supra note 5, at 37-38. See also Adams & Sevitch supra
note 52 at D. 11.5.3 and accompanying text.
161. 176 Cal. App. 3d 666, 222 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1986).
162. 187 Cal. App. 3d 156, 231 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1987).
163. Therefore, neither appellate decision provides authority for retroactive application to
cases filed after the legislature amended sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 in 1986 where the property
was acquired prior to 1984. See 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 539, sec. 1 at - (amending CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2) (retroactive application was amended to comport with the narrowest
holding of Buol and Fabian).
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title to property during marriage by an instrument naming them as
joint tenants.164 The trial court held that the husband and wife agreed
at the time of acquisition that the property was the separate property
of the wife.'6 Buol clearly applied because the wife filed the petition
for dissolution prior to the enactment of section 4800.1 .I66 Neverthe-
less, the Delgado court was highly critical of Buol.167
In criticizing Buol, the Delgado court stated that the California
Supreme Court unnecessarily left open the question of whether all
retroactive applications of section 4800.1 violate due process. 63 The
court then stated that the legal analysis in Buol would not constitu-
tionally permit retroactive application of section 4800.1 to cases where
an agreement took place prior to the enactment of the statute. 69
2. Enactmeht of the Urgency Statute
In April of i986, the legislature, reacting to Buol, 70 enacted an
urgency statute which repealed the retroactive application of sections
4800.1 and 4800.2 to proceedings commenced prior to January 1,
1984.171 The legislature further amended sections 4800.1 and 4800.2
and declared that the statutes were applicable to all proceedings
commenced on or after January 1, 1984 regardless of when the
164. Delgado, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 668, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 120. The property was conveyed
to the wife by her sister via a grant deed naming the couple as joint tenants. Id.
165. Id. The agreement that the property was the separate property of the wife was actually
between the grantor and the husband. Id.
166. Id. at 669, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (in addition, the trial court entered judgment prior
to enactment of the section).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 670, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 121 ("the question is left open for speculation"). Justice
King of the First Appellate District, author of the Delgado opinion, also was the author of
the vacated Buol appellate court opinion. See In re Marriage of Buol, 159 Cal. App. 3d 751,
705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985), vacated, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 754, 218 Cal. Rptr.
31 (1985).
169. Delgado, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 670-71, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 121. Buol stated that the
oral agreement between the husband and wife established the wife's separate property interest
from the time the wife purchased the home. In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 757, 705
P.2d 354, 358, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34 (1985). This statement may not necessarily mean that an
oral agreement made prior to or subsequent to the acquisition of property will be treated the
same as an oral agreement made at the time of the acquisition of property. The status of
property is normally determined at the time of acquisition. Id. Whether the same deference
will be given to oral agreements regarding the status of the property as community or separate
is unclear. See Adams and Sevitch, supra note 52 at D.11.5.0.2 (partially supports the
interpretation of Buol expressed by the Delgado court, but also offers a much wider array of
alternatives for limiting or extending Buol).
170. See 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 49, sec. 2, at 91-92 (specifically cites Buol in the text of the
statute).
171. Id., sec. 1, at 91.
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parties acquired the property. The legislature also contended that the
judicially imposed limits on retroactive application of sections 4800.1
and 4800.2 were unclear. 72 Since the enactment of the emergency
statute, the courts have decided only one case concerning sections
4800.1 and 4800.2.
3. In re Marriage of Griffis
In In re Marriage of Griffis, 73 the couple established a joint
checking account in both their names.174 Both husband and wife
contributed separate property funds to the account. 175 In Griffis the
husband filed the petition for dissolution after the 1984 enactment
of sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 but before the enactment of the 1986
urgency statute. 176 The husband contended that the funds in the
account were primarily his separate property.'
77
The Griffis court affirmed the trial court's characterization of the
account as community property.' 78 The appellate court did not,
however, affirm the application of section 4800.2. The court applied
the constitutional analysis employed in Buol and Fabian to determine
whether the application of section 4800.2 to the account was uncon-
stitutional.
79
The Griffis court first determined whether the wife had a vested
right in the account.'80 The couple opened the account during the
172. See 18 CAL. L. Rav. Comm. REP. 383, 388 (1985) (discussion of the possible inter-
pretations of Buo).
173. 187 Cal. App. 3d 160, 231 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1986) (the case was filed after the enactment
of section 4800.2, but prior to the urgency statute enacted in April 1986). The Griffis court
refers to the issue as "one of first impression." Id. at 164, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
174. Griffis, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 159, 231 Cal. Rptr. 511.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 160, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 511. See 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 342, secs. 1-2, at 1538
(enacting CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2 (West Supp. 1988)).
177. Griffis, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 159, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
178. Id. at 162, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 512-13 (the result would have been the same applying
either pre-1984 statutory or case law). The trial court determined that the couple did not effect
an agreement regarding the status of the account as community or separate. Id. Both section
4800.1 and the previous form of title presumption of section 5110 require proof of an
agreement to rebut the community property presumption, and therefore, since no agreement
was found (oral or written), no conflict existed between the new and prior law. See CAL. Crv.
CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1988) (written agreement required to rebut presumption).
179. Id. at 162-67, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 513-17.
180. Id. The Griffis court applied the Bouquet definition of a vested interest: property not
subject to a condition precedent is vested. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 591,
546 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976).
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period section 5110 and Lucas were in effect.' 8' The account was not
subject to a condition precedent.8 2 Accordingly, the Griffis court
determined that, from the time the couple opened the account, the
wife held a vested community property interest in the account."'3
Next, the Griffis court determined whether the impairment of the
vested right violated due process of law. 84 To this end, the court
applied the constitutional analysis pronounced in Buol and Fabian.'5
Griffis primarily focused on the nexus between the need for retro-
active application and the effectuation of the state interest.'86 With
only minimal analysis, the court found the nexus insufficient to
justify impairment of a vested interest.'87 The Griffis court stated
that the California Supreme Court holdings in Buol and Fabian
clearly resolved this issue.' s8
Unlike prior decisions which focused on the constitutionality of
retroactive application of sections 4800.1 and 4800.2, Griffis is com-
pletely devoid of any discussion of reliance on former law. 89 The
appellate court in Griffis, in reversing the trial court's application of
section 4800.2, stated that application of 4800.2 would impair the
wife's vested right in the account without due process of law. 90 The
language of the urgency statute enacted by the legislature did not
influence the Griffis court.'9 '
181. Griffis, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 514-15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110
(West Supp. 1988).
182. Griffis, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 514-15.
183. Id. at 166, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
184. Id.
185. Id. See also Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 592, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432
(factors in this type of due process analysis).
186. Griffis, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 166, 231 Cal. Rptr at 516. "If a property right vests
before the enactment of a statute, such a right may not be altered except in those rare instances
when it is necessary to promote a significantly important state interest." Id.
187. Id.
188. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338 (the legislative
intent for enacting 4800.2 is without merit). See supra notes 210, 223 and accompanying text.
189. Griffis, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 166, 231 Cal. Rptr at 516 (Buol and Fabian attempt to
determine the degree to which the parties relied on prior law).
190. Id. at 167, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (the husband was denied reimbursement for his
contributions).
191. Id. at 167, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 516. The Griffis court observed:
The emergency enactment itself notes that the Boul decision has caused confusion
and frustrates the intent of the legislature. However, it does not appear that the
confusion caused by the non-retroactive application of sections 4800.1 and 4800.2
in addition to the frustration of legislative intent provides a sufficient basis for
impairing vested property rights.
Id.
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4. Further Legislative Reaction
The legislature enacted another version of sections 4800.1 and
4800.2, effective January 1, 1987.192 The legislature's express intent
for enacting the amendments was to remedy the inconsistency and
confusion caused by statutory and case law. The statute expressly
finds that the state has a significant interest in applying sections
4800.1 and 4800.2 retroactively. Whether the court will agree that
retroactive application of the statutes will not violate due process
remains to be seen.
II. PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS
The Buol and Fabian decisions clearly define the constitutional
tests for determining whether the retroactive application of a statute
violates due process of law. The courts weigh the state interest in
retroactively enacting a statute against the interest of a party whose
interest is impaired by the retroactive enactment. This balancing test
necessarily requires that either the legislature or the California Su-
preme Court assign an appropriate weight to the state interest and
the impaired right. The analysis should, therefore, commence with a
discussion of the respective roles of the two branches of state
government in determining those interests.
The California Constitution, unlike the federal Constitution which
is a grant of power to Congress, is a restriction on the powers of
the legislature. 19 The legislature may therefore exercise any power
which is not denied by the Constitution. Any doubt concerning the
power of the legislature to act should be resolved in favor of the
legislature. 94 Accordingly, the courts must have no doubt that ret-
192. 1986 Stat. ch. 539, sec. 1, at __ (amending 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 49, sec. 1, at - )
(the amendment is to the text of section 4800.1; however, the text expressly states that the
amended provisions also apply to section 4800.2).
193. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 180, 624 P.2d 1215, 1221, 172
Cal. Rptr. 487, 493 (1981) (quoting Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor, 5 Cal. 3d
685, 691, 488 P.2d 161, 164-65, 97 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1971)) (specifies the powers the California
Constitution that vest in the legislature and the degree of deference the courts should give that
power).
194. Id. See e.g., Collins v. Rile, 24 Cal. 2d 912, 914, 152 P.2d 169, 171 (1944) (states
that the legislature is the exponent of the public will and acts of the legislature should be
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
roactive application of either section 4800.1 or 4800.2 violates due
process before declaring these sections unconstitutional. However,
the state interest in enacting section 4800.1 and section 4800.2 dif-
fers. 195 Therefore, the future of each statute will be discussed sepa-
rately.
A. Section 4800.1
The legislature contends that section 4800.1 is evidentiary in na-
ture. 96 Generally, the legislature may alter evidentiary rules affecting
the burden of proof.' 97 The Buol court, however, rejected the claim
that section 4800.1 merely affected the burden of proof. Rather, the
statute imposed an impossible evidentiary burden on the party as-
serting a separate property right and, therefore, was a substantive
measure.198
The chronology of events in Buol can be distinguished from those
addressed by the 1986 amendment to section 4800.1.199 When the
Buols filed for dissolution, existing law did not require a party
asserting a separate property interest to prove the existence of a
written agreement concerning the character of the property.20° Since
the wife in Buol had virtually no chance of obtaining a written
agreement after the case was filed, the wife was confronted with an
"impossible evidentiary burden. ' 20 ' Because the provisions of the
sustained if possible); Lawton v. Board of Medical Examiners, 143 Cal. 2d 256, 260, 299 P.2d
362, 366 (1956) (courts have a general duty to uphold the constitutionality of legislative
enactments whenever possible); Darlington v. Basalt Rock Co., 157 Cal. 2d 575, 321 P.2d 490
(even if the court has a rationale doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute, the statute
should be upheld).
195. 16 CA. LAW RFv. ComM. REP. 2165 (1982). The legislature intended section 4800.2
to protect the community by limiting the ways in which a party may show proof of an
agreement concerning the nature of property. Id. On the other hand, section 4800.2 protects
the interest of a separate property contributor by reversing the presumption regarding the
property interests of spouses upon dissolution of their marriage. Id.
196. Id. ("a presumption affecting the burden of proof").
197. See 5 B. WnKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIroP.tA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 282-286 (8th
ed. 1974 and Supp. 1984). See also Comment, supra note 96, at 1011-15 (review of previous
distinctions between vested rights and evidentiary rules).
198. In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 759-60, 705 P.2d 354, 359, 218 Cal. Rptr.
31, 36 (1985).
199. Compare Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 764, 705 P.2d at 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (applies to
cases filed prior to enactment of section 4800.1) with CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp.
1988) (applies to property acquired prior to enactment of the statutes).
200. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 755-56, 705 P.2d at 356-57, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34 (an oral
agreement sufficiently preserved the separate property interest).
201. Id. at 757, 705 P.2d at 357, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
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1986 enactment may not necessarily impose an equivalent impossible
evidentiary burden of proof, the statute may survive constitutional
scrutiny.
Presumably, under section 4800.1, if a couple wished to comply
with the retroactive writing requirement mandated in the 1986 amend-
ment, they could simply memorialize their prior oral agreement. 202
The statute does not state that the written agreement must be
contemporaneous with the acquisition of the property.23 To the
contrary, the legislature apparently encourages couples to confirm
oral agreements in writing prior to dissolution. 204 Under these circum-
stances, the post acquisition agreement would not create an "impos-
sible evidentiary burden" previously denounced by the California
Supreme Court.
If a spouse is unwilling to confirm a prior oral agreement in
writing, however, the Buol principle should remain intact. In such
an instance, the "statute of frauds" provided in section 4800.1 bars
the spouse from asserting the existence of a prior oral agreement. 205
Under Buol, an absolute bar to the assertion of a vested interest is
the equivalent of an impossible evidentiary burden. 20 The retroactive
application of section 4800.1 impairs the vested interest which arose
under the oral agreement. 207 Buol forbids such an impairment. Con-
sequently courts must continue in these circumstances to determine
the status of property in accordance with the methodology discussed
in Lucas despite the express language to the contrary in section
4800.1.
202. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.1(a)(3) (West Supp. 1988). See 18 CAL. L. REV. CowLM. REP,
383 (1986) (refers to reconfirming a prior oral agreement).
203. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1(a)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
204. Id. See 18 CAL. REV. COMM. REP. 383 (1986) ("it is appropriate to require that the
parties reconfirm an oral agreement in writing . .. "),
205. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.1(b) (West Supp. 1988).
206. Buol, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 758-60, 705 P.2d at 358-59, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36, The
California Supreme Court has already determined that the nexus between the effectuation of
the state interest and the retroactive application of section 4800.1 is insufficient to justify
impairment of vested property interests. Id. at 761-62, 705 P.2d at 360-61, 218 Cal. Rptr. at
37-38. The court also stated that, in enacting the 1984 version of section 4800.1, the legislature
failed to set forth the reasons underlying a statute of frauds requirement, The motivation of
the legislature was inferred by the court. The court also stated that retroactive application of
section 4800.1 in Buol would not have advanced the inferred goal of providing for the equitable
distribution of community property because the property was the separate of the wife, This
argument is circular, however, because the determination that the property was separate
property was, in fact, dependent on whether section 4800.1 was retroactively applied or not.
Id. at 754, 705 P.2d at 355, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
207. Id. See id. at 759, 705 P.2d at 359, 218 Cal Rptr. at 35-36 (the court states that
section 4800.1 affects the vested property right itself).
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This result would not comport with the express intent of the
legislature in enacting section 4800. 1.208 The legislature, in enacting
section 4800.1, primarily intended to eliminate the need to maintain
two different bodies of family law. 209 Yet, where retroactive application
of section 4800.1 creates an impossible evidentiary burden for the
separate property contributor, the need for the former characterization
rules remain. Because the legislative intent is significantly frustrated
the state interest in retroactively enacting the statute is accordingly less
apparent.
B. Section 4800.2
The conflict between the legislature and the judiciary over the
retroactive application of section 4800.2 is straightforward. The leg-
islature disapproves of the judicially created gift presumption. 210 The
legislature retroactively replaced the gift presumption with section
4800.2.211 According to the California Supreme Court, retroactive
application impairs vested property rights without due process. 212 The
due process analysis of Fabian requires an examination of the state's
interest in enacting the statute.213 If the law sought to be remedied is
not a manifestly unjust law, retroactive application of the law is not
reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a sufficiently important
state interest.
214
The California Supreme Court determined that the rule in Lucas is
not manifestly unjust. 2 5 Thus all retroactive applications of section
4800.2 apparently fail to serve the requisite state interest. The court,
however, should examine whether section 4800.2 legitimately accom-
208. See 18 CAL. L. REv. Combi. REP. 383 (1986). The legislature expressly stated that
the intent underlying the enactment of section 4800.1 is to provide a uniform and consistent
standard of proof for the characterization of property acquired during marriage. The writing
requirement of section 4800.1 supposedly provides a reliable test which eradicates problems of
memory and recall. The requirement also impedes a spouse from falsely claiming the existence
of an oral agreement. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id. (the legislature stated that the injustice caused by the gift presumption of
Lucas is a widespread and substantial cause of public concern).
211. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 4800.1 (a)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
212. See In re Marriage of Fabian 41 Cal.3d 440, 449, 715 P.2d 253, 258, 224 Cal. Rptr.
333, 338 (1986) (Lucas was not inherently inequitable or unfair).
213. See supra notes 151-158 and accompanying text.
214. See e.g., Fabian 41 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338 (the
court states that the legislature has an "unexplained desire" to overrule Lucas).
215. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 763, 705 P.2d at 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
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plishes the express goals the legislature.2 1 6 In amending section 4800.2,
the legislature intends to protect the interests of the separate property
contributor.21 7 However, the legislature also expounds support for the
strong public policy favoring community ownership .
2 1
Prior to enactment of section 4800.2, a spouse could preserve the
separate property nature of a contribution simply by effectuating an
oral agreement to that end.21 9 The effectuation of an oral agreement
regarding the status of the property is strong evidence that the parties
were aware of and relied on existing law in arranging their affairs.
2 0
With the enactment of section 4800.1, however, oral agreements have
no effect in preserving a separate property right. 22' Recognizing the
unfairness of completely abrogating the oral agreement, the legislature
enacted section 4800.2 to preserve some separate property rights. 
2
Thus, section 4800.2 is consistent with the premise that a party should
not be penalized for reliance on the law. 3
Yet, section 4800.2 operates to reimburse a party who has no
agreement regarding the character of the separate property contribution
in the same manner as a party who has an oral agreement which is
nullified by section 4800.1.2 In contrast to the reliance on prior law
evidenced by an agreement consistent with the law, the absence of an
agreement is evidence of either a lack of reliance or of the intent of
a gift to the community.2 The state interest will not be served better
by rescuing parties who had the opportunity, but, failed to protect
their interests. Also, if the parties relied on prior law and intended
that the separate property contribution was a gift to the community,
section 4800.2 penalizes the community for relying on prior law. Since
prior law created a presumption of a gift to the community, the
community gained nothing by memorializing an oral agreement. In
216. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
217. 18 CAL. L. REv. CoMm. REP. 383 (1986) (the committee refers to the injustice to
persons who contributed separate property for use by the community).
218. Id.
219. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
220. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 763, 705 P.2d at 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
221. CAL. Crv. CODE § 4800.1(b) (West Supp. 1988).
222. See Shue & Velman, supra note 5, at 8 (the authors suggest that section 4800.2 was
enacted to mitigate the impact of section 4800.1). The authors also describe the statute as
creating a no interest loan to the community. Id.
223. See Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 764, 705 P.2d at 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (the court
disapproves of retroactive application of section 4800.1 as a "penalty for prescience of changes
in the law").
224. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1988).
225. In re Marriage of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 450-51, 715 P.2d at 259-60, 224 Cal. Rptr.
at 339-40.
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fact, the community interest was equally served by evidence that the
parties had no agreement whatsoever regarding the status of the
contribution. In such instances, section 4800.2 negates the effect of a
prior oral agreement by creating a right of reimbursement in the
separate property contributor at the expense of the community. This
application of section 4800.2 undermines the public policy favoring
the community ownership. 26
Additionally, the reimbursement scheme provided in section 4800.2
does not completely abrogate the pro rata apportionment scheme as
claimed by the legislature. 7 A written agreement, executed prior to
1984, satisfies the later enacted writing requirement provided in section
4800.1, and therefore successfully rebuts the presumption that arises
from the form of title.- Prior to the enactment of sections 4800.1
and 4800.2, a party who rebutted the community property presumption
was entitled to a pro-rata apportionment of the value of the resi-
dence. 29 In contrast, section 4800.2 provides that the separate property
contributor is entitled to reimbursement. In such an instance, section
4800.2 interferes with vested contractual rights and therefore runs
afoul of due process.230
Moreover, section 4800.2 expressly states that the section applies to
the division of community property. 231 Once a spouse establishes a
separate interest in property acquired during marriage under section
4800.1, the property is not entirely community property. 232 Hence,
section 4800.2 should not apply. As a result, courts will be required
to apply the pro rata apportionment method for dissolution provided
in Lucas.233
CONCLUSION
Despite the explicit statement of Legislative intent provided by the
1986 amendments to sections 4800.1 and 4800.2, retroactive application
226. 18 CAL. L. REV. Coma. REP. 383 (1986).
227. Id.
228. CAL. Crv. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1988) (the statute does not state that the
agreement must have been contemporaneous with acquisition).
229. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 290, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
230. See In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 757, 705 P.2d at 360, 205 Cal. Rptr. at
37 (impairment of contract right usually unconstitutional). See 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY o
CALtoRNiA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 282-286 (8th ed. 1974 and Supp. 1984) (generally,
the law will not interfere with vested contractual rights).
231. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1988).
232. Id. § 4800.1 (b) (referring to the property as separate property and not community
property).
233. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
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of the sections fails to further the state interest in providing for the
equitable dissolution of marriages. Impairing vested rights of parties
who relied on former law in order to provide an allegedly more
equitable result to parties who did not rely on prior law violates due
process. Additionally, retroactive application of sections 4800.1 and
4800.2 will not eliminate the need to maintain two sets of law for
cases in which the parties had prior oral or written agreements. The
least confusing and the most equitable resolution of the retroactivity
conflict is to prohibit the retroactive application of sections 4800.1
and 4800.2 to property interests which arose under the prior law.
Arthur G. Woodward

